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UNNECESSARY DELAYS IN APPELLATE
PROCEDURE
L. L. BOMBERGER*
Delays in the courts have always been with us. They have
been criticized and defended. Many plausible arguments have
been advanced against too hasty disposition of litigation. The
last decade has witnessed a very marked intensification of complaint of delays, largely directed to what is characterized as
antiquated procedure. No less authority than the late Chief
Justice Taft has been unsparing in his denunciation of criminal
procedure. There is no doubt that the only defenders of the
system are the members of the bar, for laymen universally believe that there is something inherently defective in the manner
in which litigation is conducted and disposed of. They believe,
moreover, that the lawyers are responsible for these defects and
selfishly support and defend them.
The courts and lawyers must recognize that; as their contribution to society, they have a duty, either to correct the
errors, if such there be, into which their profession is charged
to have fallen, or to convince the people who support our institutions that such errors do not exist.
It is not the purpose of this discussion to enter the controversial field as to whether there is a proper time for deliberation, and even delay, nor the extent of it, in the progress of
litigation, but to direct your attention entirely to the delays
occurring in appellate procedure. We all know that the commencement of an action, or the institution of criminal proceedings, carries no presumption of the right to recover or of the
guilt of the defendant. In a civil case the plaintiff has the
burden of proof; in a criminal case it is upon the state. This is
a wholesome and thoroughly grounded rule. Fortunately, we
* Of the Hammond Bar.
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have no such thing in America as convicting a man at the bar
of public opinion, or of compelling him to prove his innocence
of a crime. Therefore, until there is a judgment in either a
civil or criminal case, no one can say ex cathedra which side
should prevail.
But when a case has reached the point of decision in the trial
court, prima facie one side is right. The presumption of the
correctness of a judgment accompanies it through the courts
of appeal and review, regardless of which side prevails below.
The trial court must be able to say that the judgment is clearly
right; the reviewing court cannot disturb unless it finds that
the judgment is clearly wrong.
Therefore, after judgment, we are no longer dealing with the
situation of an open controversy. There is a decision presumptively correct. In other words, before the decision we did not
know judicially that the successful party was right. After
judgment the rights of the parties are fixed, and there should
be the least possible delay in the execution of the judgment,
whether it be restoration of property or punishment of a
criminal.
Whatever justification, therefore, may be found for delay in
the trial court, that justification no longer exists after a decision
has been reached there. So it is, therefore, clear that, while
prior to judgment the parties litigant may, with propriety, or at
least in consonance with the tendency of human nature, delay,
within the limits of the law, the day when they must answer, yet
when a decision has been reached, delay, except such as is imperative to present the case for review, and in the reviewing court
an opportunity to consider it deliberately and decide it correctly,
is intolerable and unjustified. It then becomes a case of withholding that to which one is lawfully entitled. In a criminal
case unconscionable delay on appeal, either unjustly punishes a
man who is unable, under the laws of Indiana, to give bail while
awaiting a decision in the Supreme Court, or if he is at liberty,
it unfairly stays the hand of justice and denies to the state that
which it has a right to exact speedily of the culprit.
Our proposition, then, is that, by and large, a party gets all
the delay which he has any right to expect or demand before
the decision of his case in the lower court; that whatever delay
he obtains in preparing, presenting or getting a decision on his
appeal, beyond that essentially necessary, is to that extent a
denial of justice to his opponent who prevailed below. Illustra-
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tions of such injustice will doubtless occur to the minds of all of
us and could be multiplied indefinitely with many soul stirring
accounts of delayed justice which in the end was injustice.
In Indiana, I believe, we have fallen into very bad lines. Responsibility for this situation rests jointly upon the courts and
the bar. I fear that lawyers generally have the impression that
when a case is on appeal, it is tucked away and put at rest for
an indefinite period. Usually it is the last thing to which a lawyer will give attention. In reality, it should receive his first consideration. If the ultimate end of our legal procedure, as a part
of the social order and an instrumentality of the state, is to do
justice, certainly the man who has obtained a judgment prima
facie correct, is entitled to the first call on the time of interested
lawyers. This applies not only to his own counsel, who may be
more directly concerned, but there is furthermore a duty upon
his opponent not unduly to delay the doing of complete justice,
even at the expense of his client who has been proved to be
wrong.
A study of 13 criminal cases and 5 civil cases in the Supreme
Court, and 15 civil cases in the Appellate Court, all selected at
random from the docket within the last few years, is illuminating. The study is confessedly not exhaustive enough to warrant
the claim that these cases present a cross-section of the situation, but cases were deliberately selected in which extensions of
time were granted with a view of disclosing the abuse of this
practice. The study is made collectively because it would be
unfair to the Supreme Court to conclude that because it decides
fewer cases than the Appellate Court, it is less diligent or industrious, for it must be remembered that the Supreme Court is
required not only to carry its own docket, but to review a large
percentage of the cases that pass through the Appellate Court.
No one but a member of the court can say exactly how much
time is consumed in disposing of petitions to transfer, but that
the system of handling these petitions is unwieldy and fraught
with unnecessary delay will be discussed later on.
The 33 cases examined passed entirely through the lower
courts in the average time of 12 months. The average time consumed in filing all the briefs, including the 30 day submission
period, was 13 months. If the briefs had been promptly filed,
under the rule, this would have been only 41/2 months.
In these cases 119 extensions of time were granted to the appellant, with an average of almost 4 to a case, and 55 extensions
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were granted to appellee. The average time of the total extensions was 13 months per case. The industry of attorneys is
strikingly contrasted in the fact that of these cases, one was
fully briefed in 1
months after filing the transcript, and the
briefing period extended from this to the astonishing extreme of
3 years and 3 months. The maximum number of extensions
granted in a case was 10 to the appellant and 10 to the appellee.
In one case that required 3 years to brief, the appellant obtained 3 extensions and the appellee 2. These extensions were
granted over the objections of the other side. The attorneys who
briefed their case in 11/2 months got little for their pains, because the Supreme Court kept it under consideration for 4
years.
That the delay in these cases was not all upon the part of
the attorneys is proved by the startling fact that the average
time for decision, after the cases were fully briefed, was 3 years
and 9 months.1
In one case a petition to advance was granted in 1926. The
decision was written almost exactly 4 years thereafter.
There is reason, therefore, for the widespread conviction that
there is undue delay in appellate procedure. Few lawyers are
willing to accept any share of the responsibility, but nonchalantly pass it off by placing the blame upon the courts. The
responsibility is joint and the evil can be remedied only by voluntary cooperation on the part of both the courts and the bar.
What, it is asked, can be done? The Attorney General of the
United States is quoted as saying recently that we hear only the
criticisms of legal procedure, with no constructive suggestions.
Without pretence of consummate wisdom, the following changes
I The following amazing history of a case in the Supreme Court is
vouched for by the attorney for the appellant. He was required by the
court below to furnish an appeal bond in the sum of $50,000. The appeal
was taken in the summer of 1924, the case was fully briefed in the Appellate Court, and argued orally in about two years after filing. The Appellate
Court being unable to agree upon a decision, certified the case to the
Supreme Court early in 1927. It was re-argued in that court in January,
1928. No decision has yet been rendered. In the meantime, the assets of
the corporation which were at stake in this litigation have shrunken almost
to the point of disappearance, while the appellant has been compelled to
pay a total of $4,000 in premiums to the surety company on the appeal

bond. It is said that both parties to this litigation have long since despaired
of reaping any benefits therefrom, and even intimate that if the case is
held much longer, they will be inclined to get in a bad humor and say uncomplimentary things about courts.
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are offered in the hope that if they do nothing more, they may
provoke sufficient discussion to bring about beneficial results.
It may be asked why one who lacks judicial experience essays
to advise the court, or suggests reforms in procedure, but must
the physician be ill to diagnose or prescribe for the ailment of
his patient? Must one be a bankrupt to counsel those who are
in financial stress? Except for the indefensible statute permitting 6 months to appeal, the remedy is practically within the
control of the courts in the making and enforcement of their
rules. Doubtless, they hesitate to act arbitrarily, or go beyond
the point where they are generally supported by the bar, but
some things can be done. Courageous action, though radical,
may be criticized, but in the end should be its own reward.
First. The anomalous rule of submitting a case 30 days after
filing should be abolished. It rests neither in right nor reason.
A case should be considered submitted when filed, and jurisdictional questions should be permitted in the appellee's brief. The
appellant should be required to file his brief with the transcript,
or within 30 days thereafter. We all know that in the preparation and filing of a transcript, counsel's mind is centered on the
cause to such an extent that then is the logical time to prepare
his brief. Instead of that, the transcript is filed, 90 days elapse
before the appellant is required to file a brief if he obtains no
extensions whatever, and by that time other matters having
intervened, and the whole case must be reviewed again. There
is much lost motion, and consequent unnecessary and unjust
expense upon the client. Reorientation is costly. The appellee's
brief should come in within 20 or 30 days after the appellant's
brief, and the reply brief within 10 or 15 days thereafter. Other
courts considering questions fully as difficult and complicated as
those which come before the courts of Indiana establish and enforce similar rules.2
Second. Extensions of time for filing briefs should be rarely
granted. Both the Bar and the nisi prius courts should understand that a case on appeal has the right-of-way in an attorney's
office. It is his most important business. Certainly no exten2 For illustration, New York allows the equivalent of 20 days for appellant's brief, 10 for the answer and 5 for reply. Wisconsin, 15 days for
appellant's brief, and 5 days for answer. Illinois, 20 for the appellant's
brief, 20 for the answer and 7 for reply. United States Circuit Court of
Appeal, 7th Circuit, 20 for appellant, 20 for appellee, and 10 for reply.
United States Supreme Court, 21 for appellant and 14 for answer.
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sion whatever should be granted without notice and an opportunity on the part of the opposite party to be heard. The reason
for the extension should be substantial and not perfunctory, as
is too frequently the case at this time. The granting of extensions is sometimes defended on the ground that the court is not
up with its docket, and hence, an extension can work no delay,
but that answer in a measure begs the question. Other conditions, both herein discussed and otherwise, combine to develop a
system of procrastination in both the preparation and decision
of appeals. The liberal practice of granting extensions contributes a full share to the general result.
Third. The next point concerns preparation of briefs. Much
time could be profitably spent upon this subject alone. Undoubtedly the manner of the presentation of an appeal is of tremendous weight in the decision. Rule 22 has wrecked the ambitions
of many a worthy lawyer; more than that, it has spelled disaster
for litigants without number whose causes were poorly presented
in the briefs. The easy way out is to blame the rule and the
court which promulgated it. The rule is not fairly subject to
criticism. I believe that if a lawyer will carefully study the rule
so as to understand it, and then comply with it without repetition or redundancy, and further, if the court will ignore some
of the strictures announced in by-gone days, not so remotely in
the past, briefs will be better prepared, hence appeals more readily understood and disposed of with more dispatch. Very few
briefs fail to betray uneasiness or doubt upon the part of counsel
as to what should be said and how it should be said. A case may
involve the sole question of contributory negligence, and an instruction given or refused on that point. Now it is sufficient
under the rule, and the Supreme Court has so held, to set out instructions and so much of the evidence as will show the propriety of the one tendered or the error in the refusal, but how
many briefs stop at this point! Almost invariably a narrative
of all the evidence in the case is set out regardless of its remoteness from the point in issue. Thus, a veritable heap of
rubbish is piled onto the Court. The place where the relevant
evidence is to be separated from the irrelevant, and the latter
omitted, is in the preparation of the briefs, but if appellant's
counsel fails to do this accurately, appellee has his remedy by
corrective suggestions. Attorneys seem too timid to write a
brief in this manner, and it must be said that there is foundation for this timidity, because frequently the courts have seized
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upon trifling departures from the strict letter of the rule to disregard a point. Briefs are now on file which in the narrative
of the evidence recite every adjournment and recess, and even
colloquy between counsel. This is inexcusable stupidity.
A rule that requires a complete transcript of the evidence as
a part of the record on appeal is archaic and belongs to the
"horse-and-buggy" age. We might well consider the Federal
rule, and permit the trial court to fix the bill of exceptions in

narrative form.3
A brief should state succinctly what the controversy is, and
how it was decided below. There is a rock upon which so many
slip. To state succinctly is no easy task, but upon it may depend
the result of the appeal. Justice Stone of the Supreme Court of
the United States has said in substance that most of the questions decided by that court are upon questions of fact. The
court pretty well knows the law, and its task is merely to apply
it to the case in hand. This involves a consideration of the facts.
It is important, then, to have the facts properly and clearly
stated.
Fourth. The business of the court could be expedited by setting a calendar and calling every case for oral argument. This
is done in the Supreme Court of the United States, in the Circuit Courts of Appeal, and in many of the state courts of last
resort. It might be well to require counsel to submit a brief of
points for oral argument so many days before the argument,
and to confine the oral argument to these points. Some students of appellate procedure recommend the hearing of this argument before the briefs are filed, and then confining the briefs
to the points on which the court indicates a desire to hear
further. In all probability, instead of allowing 2 hours for an
argument, the court could hear the average case in less than an
hour. There would be no place for extended oratory, but rather
a round-table discussion, by which would readily be developed
either the fallacy of the appellant's propositions or the error of
4
the court below.
3 One case went to the Appellate Court of Indiana and was decided on
the propriety of instructions and the sufficiency of evidence where, because
of the loss of a shorthand notebook, over half the evidence was embodied in
the bill of exceptions in narrative form. It required seven pages, while
that part of it which was set out verbatim required nearly a hundred pages.
The seven pages got precisely as far, and was exactly as accurate and
reliable as the hundred pages.
4 The New York Court of Appeals sets 8 causes each day and the
United States Supreme Court, 10.
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Oral arguments greatly clarify contentions. There are but
few substantial questions in any appeal. Some attorneys, and
this school is not a small one, believe in an omnibus attack, presenting everything trifling, or otherwise, in the hope, as Justice
Holmes once said, that something would be made to stick. Others concentrate on points which they can emphasize and, moreover, do not smother up as a few grains of wheat in many bushels of chaff. Moreover, arguments limited to 20 or 30 minutes
on a side would be excellent lessons in concentration. It is wellknown that the most efficient counsel appearing before the Supreme Court of the United States are usually very brief. One
famous member of that court, a few years ago as a practitioner
therein successfully presented a very important case in a printed
brief of 6 pages, citing 2 cases. Few cases will not lend themselves to a policy on the part of counsel of constantly narrowing
the issue: as a case progresses through the courts, they should
gradually focus and not scatter.
Fifth. Is there any reason why, in this age of rapid communication and highly efficient mechanism for getting results,
an unsuccessful party should be allowed sixty days to apply for
a rehearing in a court of review? Yet that is one of our "horseand-buggy" rules adopted in 1900. This is challenged in the
light of the fact, for example, that one is obliged to appeal from
an order appointing a receiver within 10 days, and get his transcript on file within that time. Why should one not be able to
prepare his petition for rehearing within 10 or 20 days at the
outside? He cannot raise new matter; certainly the cause has
become narrowly centered upon one, or at most, very few points,
and it seems that in the exercise of diligence, one should be
able, within a very few days, to make his appeal for rehearing.
This situation can be cured by amending Rule 29. This unduly
lengthy period is criticized also in the light of Rule 29 which
requires the party opposing a transfer to fie his brief within
10 days after the petition to transfer must be filed; 30 days is
allowed for a petition to transfer. This is really too long, but
why should 60 days be permitted to ask for rehearing? 5
Sixth. Petitions to transfer must be the bane of the life of
some judges of the Supreme Court; others have seemed per5 Illinois allows 15 days to petition for rehearing and 10 days to answer
the petition; New York Court of Appeals allows 15 days for the petition.
Wisconsin, 40 days to petition and 10 days to answer. The 7th C. C. A.
20 days.

The United States Supreme Court, 40 days.
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fectly complacent in their presence. Each justice has a transfer docket, and it is understood that the petitions are assigned
to the several judges, and called up for conference and disposition when the judge having the particular petition on his docket
is prepared to do so. This system greatly tends to delay. It
is notorious that petitions pend for 2, 3 and 4 years. As the
vast majority of civil appeals go to the Appellate Court, petitions to transfer probably cause the greatest injustice of any
feature of appellate practice.
If the court would set one day each month for hearing these
petitions orally, the possibilities are that much progress could
be made in disposing of them. There are but two questions that
can be presented in a petition to transfer, and there should not
be great difficulty in reaching a decision. By this method, all
petitions would be heard by all the members of the court, thus
avoiding the present condition of one judge of the Supreme
Court, in all practical effect, passing upon the work of the entire
bench or three members of the Appellate Court. Moreover, we
would be saved the sorry spectacle that we have witnessed in
Indiana, of one judge leaving the Supreme Bench with 49 petitions for transfer upon his desk. It is frequently said that Indiana decisions are one-man opinions. It is admitted that unless
a case is argued orally, or is otherwise an exception, it is not
considered by the judges except the one writing the opinion until
the latter is brought in for consideration in conference. Appellate judges are selected for their collective wisdom, and litigants
should enjoy the privilege of having all of the judges thoroughly
familiar with each appeal. This is probably true in Indiana
where cases are argued orally.0
Fifteen minutes of intelligent, carefully prepared and well
presented argument ought to be enough in the average case to
give the court a pretty accurate idea of the merits of the petition.

We can take a lesson from the work of the Court of Appeals
of Ohio. The three judges on the circuit attend at a given time
in each county, and hear orally all the appeals arising therein.
Of course, briefs are filed, but the discussions are informal and
6 In the Supreme Court of the United States, it is the practice to agree
upon the line of decision immediately after the argument, and then assign
the case to a justice for writing the opinion. His opinion is a composite
of the judgment of the court, and not one man's ideas submitted to his
colleagues for censorship.
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usually not unduly extended. Many of the cases, it is said, are
decided without leaving the Bench, at least the court is able to
announce the character of its decision, and very shortly thereafter render its opinion. The Supreme Court of Ohio usually
decides a case which it takes over within 4 months after the
Court of Appeals has decided it, and the court is striving to
shorten this average to 30 days, and believes it ought to do so.
Without advice as to the present situation in Ohio, it is known
that a few years ago when the Supreme Court adjourned for
the summer vacation, not a case remained on its docket that had
been filed 60 days before. In one case involving a great emergency, the court received the briefs a day after the case had
been filed, heard it the third day, and decided it the fourth day.
This, of course, is an exceptional case, but no more so than many
that are found on the other extreme in Indiana. Who can say
that the case decided within 4 days was not correctly decided, or
that in the long run, an early decision is not more substantially
just than a delayed one?
Reference is repeatedly made to the informal, speedy and
withal, satisfactory practice in the English and Canadian Courts
of Review. Delay is rare and appeals are usually decided within
six weeks after the rendition of judgment below. Who can deny
that substantial justice is done in these jurisdictions?
This discussion could be indefinitely prolonged by a citation
of authorities in support of the general proposition here advanced, that there is undue delay in appellate procedure, and
this is particularly true in Indiana, but the case for remedial
action will be concluded with this observation; that the Bar and
the courts must be stirred out of what may be deliberately
called lethargy into which, by years of routine, we have inadvertently fallen. A radical revision of the rules and practice,
and the conduct of counsel in the preparation and presentation
of cases on appeal will render a great service to the people of
Indiana who are unfortunate enough to be engaged in litigation.

